Lila Abu-Lughod makes it clear in her abstract that reification of culture, or wanting to make cultural and religious practices by Muslim women especially practical and concrete, is problematic in the sense that it’s an objectification. In other words, over-analyzing and incorporating politics ultimately strips cultural complex practices of its value and significance and places judgement on it, as if it is a tangible thing, relating it to rights and liberty, and whether their practices are interfering or almost victimizing these women and their socially and politically aligned entitlements.
One quote that stuck out to me during Abu-Lughod’s mention of her interviews in the U.S, with acknowledgement of constructions of Islam in relation to broadcasted politics, is “as if knowing something about women and Islam or the meaning of a religious ritual would help one understand the tragic attack on New York’s World Trade Center and the U.S. Pentagon, or how Afghanistan had come to be ruled by the Taliban, or what interests might have fueled US,” (p. 785). This quote is truly significant when attempting to unravel Abu-Lughod’s critique on constructions of Muslim women and “vocations of saving others” due to the evidence of these interview questions specifically indicating assumptions of a potential internal crisis within Islam that may be a result of tragic attacks or terrorist acts.
Contributing to more shocking news, in Laura Bush’s speech, bombings in Afghanistan, supported by neat cultural icons: “rejoiced” Afghan/Muslim women speakers, were portrayed as assistant in liberating women from their households, which simultaneously served as supposed imprisonment under the Taliban reign, and allowing them to have simple pleasures, like listening to music. Without shedding clarity on “separate causes in Afghanistan of women’s continuing malnutrition, poverty, and ill health,” (p. 784) within the speech, the Taliban, or “terrorist” control was emphasized in a greater negative perception in association with Islam and Muslim women who need saving.
Another misconception of the Taliban and terrorist reign and women’s oppression is that women were forced to wear veils, or hijabs. Due to their religion, ethnic groups, and due to the local form of covering that went on before and after the Taliban were present, it is clear that their apparel was a result of their own free choice and is a result of complex socio-cultural practices of modesty, not necessarily oppression. “If we think that U.S. women live in a world of choice regarding clothing, all we need to do is remind ourselves of the expression, “the tyranny of fashion,’” (p. 786). Clothing can be a result of hegemonic practices, dictated by constant reminder of ideologies of beauty and trends, and the U.S, then, should recognize their own cultural practices in relation to socially shared standards and moral ideologies, similar to Muslim women in other areas outside of the U.S.
Too often people, even feminists, fail to separate their desire for equality, freedom, entitlements, etc from ethical ideologies that associate with Western ideals. The want and need for general safety and sufficient living conditions for humans worldwide should outweigh the focus on historical location, Muslim women, religious labels and cultural practices.
In “Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women’s Human Rights to Protection from Violence,” Sally Engle Merry begins her article with a question pertaining to one’s understanding of their entitled or assumed rights and the problems that are associated with these rights, or lack thereof. The understanding and adoption of rights, according to Merry, needs legal intervention and protection by the law. However, this intervention by authorization only contributes to subjectivity and acknowledgement of existing subjectivity of those who need and want to acquire, understand, and fight for their rights.
“Rights-defined selves emerge from supportive encounters with police, prosecutors, judges, and probation officers. This empirical study shows how victims of violence against women come to take on rights consciousness,” (p. 343).
Subjectivities are produced through encounters with the legal system, according to her article, through various instances. For example, domestic violence specifically against women serve as a contribution to subjectivity. Although women may be in a dangerous and violent situation, they pick and choose when they want to assert, defend and reject their rights with inclusion of the law. This may be due to their splitting decision of wanting to claim their rights and security while simultaneously preserving their autonomy and role as a good wife. “They clearly fear retaliation by the batterer, but they also resist the shift in subjectivity required by the law,” (p. 345).
“Thus, an individual’s willingness to take on rights depends on her experience trying to assert them,” (p. 347). Merry shares that acting upon rights is dependent on an individual’s experience and understanding of rights in correspondence with their identity. In other words, if one believes that they are treated unjust and have the right to make a change, chances are that they will advocate and fight for that change. If rights are treated with insignificance, though, by law and the general population, the injustice in question may not be associated with rights and unjustness of rights. In either scenario, that individual is subjected to either go through some process of encounters with the legal system or is subjected to the dominant opinion of worth regarding the injustice felt by that individual.
According to Merry, encounters with the law cause women to switch up roles in accordance to the subjectivity at hand. Depending on the discourse and social practice at hand, women’s positions may switch from assertiveness to feeling out the waters of the situation they’re in and what they may want the outcome to be. Consciously adopting rights, then, requires shifts in behavior and subjectivity that correspond with an individual’s understanding and experience, their seriousness regarding implication of rights, and what is not worth reinforcing.
In the reading “Nongovernmental Organizations’ Role in the Buildup and Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1325,” there are examples of women’s efforts for reformation and acknowledgement. Though it is no secret that women have, and continue to fight for inclusion and protection, the shocking part of this reading, for me at least, is how long implementation has taken. “In 2000, the doors were open just wide enough for women to squeeze into a Security Council debate for the first time. Concerned women and men must now act on the words of Resolution 1325 to assure that the door remains open permanently,” (p. 1265). The actuality of ideas and languages associated with the resolution dates back as far as 1945, and inequality of women can be traced back even further, and yet, the year 2000, only seventeen years ago, is when the fight was barely fitted in with public and legal considerations.
Ambassador Anwarul Chowdhury of Bangladesh assisted in the gathering and encouragement of women’s need for inclusion and role in matters regarding peace and equality development during the Commission on the Status of Women by stating it to the Security Council on March 8th, 2000. He also pushed for a session with the Security Council and encouraged amalgamation between women and support from members of that council, they could achieve this and more. Eventually, after several recommendations from The Women and Armed Conflict Caucus for protection of both female children and women, increased participation and inclusion in peace and security matters, sensitivity and advisement of gender and cultural issues, etc., the Security Council agreed to support two suggestions. First, participation in peace agreements would be motivated, and second, there would be a push for a special session regarding women, peace and security.
Neither of these recommendations seem to be concrete guarantees of anything, considering that they agreed to an encouragement of inclusion and motive to help conduct a special session. Though their efforts did lead to somewhat of a motion, women’s placement in these nongovernmental organizations have not been of full implementation during modern times– where obvious inequality regarding stereotype threats, social position and gender acknowledgement, and differential compensations in a workforce entirety are still evident. How could it though? The year 2000 is a modern time in itself.
Resolution 1325 was the adopted resolution of women’s voice and decision-making being admissible regarding issues of peace negotiations, security, and conflict prevention. Regarding implementation, a presidential statement was read by Brian Cowen that “reaffirmed its strong support for increasing women’s role in decision making with regard to conflict prevention and resolution,” (p. 1261). The second Arria Formula hearing on gender justice contained testimonies that led to an “encouraged the ongoing work of women for genuine justice, peace, and an end to impunity,” (p. 1262). In relation to the protection of women during times of war, this implementation of testimonies, personal experiences, and women speaking on being used as war weapons, do serve as an example of protection and recognition. Also, panels were sponsored, as well as video screenings, on women’s insights regarding international issues and peacemaking, which ultimately allows them to have a say in womens and girls’ protection matters in cases of war conflicts.
In Gilmore’s article, she writes about an existent crisis and surplus regarding prison population and the reconstruction of the state. The crisis, being of social matter, is the actuality of imprisonment, who is being imprisoned, and historical content relating to potential reasons correlating with their imprisonment. Prison, masking as a solution for social crises among a population, has caused and continues to cause a new state, a state that she refers to as a “prison industrial complex,” (p. 178). This solution, un-coincidentally, and simultaneously rids problems associated with minorities, domestic enemies, minorities, and anyone causing civil disorder, making the state feel out of control.
“Objectively, crises are neither bad nor good, but crises do indicate inevitable change, the outcome of which is determined through struggle. Struggle, like crisis, is a politically neutral word: in this scenario, everyone struggles because they have no alternative,” (p. 178). The significance within this text, relating to prison population, is this idea that struggle is inevitable due to inexistence of an alternative. This idea, however, seems inaccurate, considering that historical events that have contributed to many particular people’s struggles, and some people’s advantages. For example, after the Great Depression, there was a heavy diminishing of work for a lot of employees, and yet, the hierarchy of the structured society still held up. This means, people in power and wealth, considerably higher classes, remained in superior classes, while the lower classes, continued to struggle within that status. Another example, emphasizing on the class issue in a hierarchy, African Americans and Latinos, who, still today, make up the majority of lower class statuses, make up the majority percentage and surplus of people in prison.
Now, without ignoring the racial factors, referring to Michelle Alexander’s “The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age of Colorblindness,” it is stated that there are more African Americans recorded in prison in the U.S, than there have been slaves. There’s obvious controversy that this is a race issue, and it very well might be, but it goes deeper than that when the actual structure of a society is coercing Social Darwinism. The need for survival, especially considering the economic instability that ultimately limits the access and opportunity for some to educate themselves, progress, and better themselves, contributes to illegal ways of earning compensation. To assume that everyone struggles because there are no alternatives, neutrally, is an understatement.
Prison, which is a huge contributor to Capitalist economies, is a way to continue a flow of currency when other markets and contributors fall or downsize. “Alternatively, all prisoners might well be required to work in the public sector, both to pay their own costs and to make profit for the state, as was the case in prisons of the US South starting at the turn of the twentieth century,” (p. 186). Referring to publicly owned prisons and reconstructions, prisoners forced to work can be one solution to society’s tax struggle. This surplus labor tax, as Gilmore calls it, or new way of industrialization to preserve the economy, can be well connected to former slavery, forcing predominantly colored, caged people to work for little to nothing. The very foundation of prisons depict a strong aligning with racism and exploitation – and is clearly being used as an alternative plan for restricting and improving the state’s political and economic standing, as opposed to being concerned of the welfare of citizens due to actual crime and danger.
In Silvia Federici’s work, In The Caliban and the Witch, she makes a strong analogy that struck me with powerful imagery. Upon discussing and referencing Marx, she makes a connection between capitalistic development and colossal concentration camps. Automatically, my thoughts drew back on my prior knowledge of Hitler’s sovereignty and concentration camps created to dehumanize Jews, and to ultimately, use in the process of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Federici even mentions later, after using this analogy, that in the seventeenth century, there has never been more exploitation of workers that resulted in “genocidal proportions” (p. 66) than under the Nazi government. The power in her analogy emphasizes the acknowledgement of the enterprise culture, or creation of capitalism, being responsible for its own sort of concentration camps including coerced workers, or slaves, who were/are exploited, and ultimate control over a fabricated hierarchical system. Within this system of hierarchy, women have been and still remain considerably of lower ranking, and yet, are still significant assets when degraded for accumulations of wealth in a capitalist political economy.
During pre-capitalist Europe, women had some social cohesion or connections among other women at “The Commons,” where social gatherings and festivals often took place. Unfortunately, this area and these events were abolished, along with a rapid decline and closing of agricultural labor. As a result, land and property was lost and men and women had to find alternative ways of making a living. Women were “being forced into a condition of chronic poverty, economic dependence, and invisibility as workers,” (p. 75). Women are emphasized as taking on more suffering due to the fact that women were either pregnant, expected to take care of their children, and ultimately could not take on jobs that needed physical strength and skills. Any jobs that were available to them were not even worth it, considering that their compensation was exceptionally lower than that of males, even in a society that solely hired very cheap labor.
This transition into capitalism meant a transition into social conflict, impoverished statuses, scarcity of food, lack of labor, production and consumption. There were many rights, many that included and were led by women, against capitalism, but ultimately, this transition also meant a reliance for capitalism’s production, distribution and exchange of wealth and goods. Regarding women once more, there was even more power of authority evident, where the system gained concern about a growth in population, and where women were held legally responsible and were supervised for mass reproduction. At one point, celibacy was penalized, in the interest of maintaining reproduction of the work force, which, obviously, is the responsibility of the only humans who can actually reproduce. “…Procreation was directly placed at the service of capitalist accumulation,” (p. 89). Federici brings acknowledgement to control over and degradation of the womb, to contraceptives, to reproduction, all as a means of an investment and industry for capitalist economies. Women in history were integrated only to serve men and marriage contracts, to carry children and for continuation of humanity, for cheap labor and to contribute to gradual increases in the capitalist economy.
Interestingly, V. Spike Peterson and Laura Parisi examines the relationship between human rights and hetero-sexism, rather than solely investigating and questioning androcentrism as the foundation of human rights. Androcentrism, or something focused specifically on men, is clearly evident through close examination of the creation of human rights for a number of reasons we have already read about and discussed. However, hetero-sexism is not something I have necessarily related to the human rights discourse until reading this week’s reading assignment.
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, hetero-sexism can be defined as a discrimination or prejudice against homosexuals by heterosexuals. With uprisings of revolutions, declarations, and ultimately of the Western civilization, there was an establishment of societal standards. These societal organizations and standards included social order and structures, language codifications, socioeconomic statuses, naturalization, a type of hierarchy within a society and ultimately, the inclusion of human rights. “Because we take modern state making as our starting point and fail to investigate this earlier transition, we ‘forget’ how political the making of sexuality and subjectivities – of ‘men’ and ‘women’ – has always been, and remains so today,” (p. 141). In other words, sexuality and gender have been appointed meanings and behaviors associated with fixed norms that are ostensibly, or seemingly, natural and innate, similar to our supposed human rights.
Much like the creation of the vague and questionable human rights, or even the rights of man, the creation of these fixed gender and sexuality identifications are advantageous for the male population for a number of reasons. Accepted and appropriate heterosexual relations equate to the acceptance of women’s subordination with acknowledgement of the equally accepted marriage contract. Hetero-sexism and masculism go hand and hand, and to limit hetero-sexism means to limit male dominance, which is essentially a problem for males in power. With sole acceptance of only heterosexual relations and binary sexual identities, hetero-sexist practices defused any potential for any other explorations, sexual orientations or gender identifications. Even in modern day societies, due to these historical definitions of “norms” in association with gender and sexuality, people are still facing oppression with regard to liberation and freedom of identity, sexual orientation and preferences. Groups, like LGBTQIA, have been created with the intent of revolutionizing how one’s identity can be interpreted and accepted where hetero-sexism is still instilled within the framework of a society.
“By normalizing hetero-sexism, non-heterosexual identities and practices are stigmatized as abnormal, thus fueling persecution of those who do not conform. And by creating the category of deviants while refusing to take responsibility for their protection, the state denies the violence it colludes in producing,” (p. 146). Again, there is still oppression within several states, considering that same-sex marriage is illegal and nonconformity of the “norm” for self-identity and sexual attraction is still subject to consequence by state law, law that is not subject to consequence for limiting someone’s self-expression and romantic desire. If hegemonic structures and governments have control over preferences, relationships, and ultimately how an individual can self-identify, then there is no question about the lack of credibility and the lack of disseminating human rights under, or even without the law, considering the actual amount of hetero-sexism built into the creation of these same human rights.
Interestingly, Samuel Moyn’s The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History mentions the word “utopia” which refers to something or somewhere imaginary, ideal and ultimately, perfect. The contradiction, though, is that rights, both of man and human, are flawed in their preserved meanings, purposes, and consistency. “The rights of man” and “human rights,” both containing conceptual differences from the past to the present, are not exactly Utopian.
As we have previously examined in prior discussions and assignments, there were precursors that led to this idea of rights belonging to man. These rights that strayed more away from religious influences and kings, and aimed more toward civil liberty, equality before the law and political movement. Enlightenment philosophers began to analyze these rights, speaking upon them, and what they should consist of, vaguely of course. “If the laws of their country did not live up to the demands of the Rights of Man, they were expected to change them, by legislation … or through revolutionary action:’42. However human in basis, rights were national political achievements first and foremost,” (Moyn, 2010, p. 31). Moyn also mentioned the fight for the right to work as a part of the rights of man, which shows that this right was formulated with the intent to continue labor and industrialization for the preservation of that area’s economy, and not necessarily to ensure that man has the capability to do work, considering that compensation was not significant for men of lower socioeconomic status.
“It must have become clearer and clearer as time passed that not the assertion of Humanity before Human Rights 31 abstract principles but the achievement of specific citizenship is what truly mattered,” (p.31). The assertion and push for rights often only became evident when a need for revolution or democratic change appeared among the people of a society. The rights of man ultimately protected and secured human rights
Some time later, the idea of human rights began to gain acknowledgement. Human rights was a more universal proposal, however, they are born rights that belong to each individual regardless of individual differences. It can still be argued that human rights, like the rights of man, has political intention, as opposed to being a pure declaration of obvious born rights. Clearly, there is controversy on the origin of rights and universalism, and therefore, its credibility and effectiveness was and is still shaky.
“The true key to the broken history of rights, then, is the move from the politics of the state to the morality of the globe, which now defines contemporary aspirations,” (p.43). In regard to modern day conceptions of human rights, according to Moyn, human rights now is the interpretation of international ethics and the yearning of ethical rights for each individual. and not necessarily used for political notion.
Personally, I have been a little stumped while reading Wendy Brown’s essay. There’s this feeling of uncertainty between whether Brown believes human rights are anti-political and whether they serve a bigger role in politics. I am uncertain if the purpose for her writing is to express distinctions between perceptions of what human rights are, how they are perceived initially and how they emerged into a completely new meaning and purpose. It is my interpretation that Brown is indicating that human rights activism cannot be limited to one defined meaning and purpose now because of evidence of a still-existent moral code that serves as a foundation for these rights and political interdependence regardless of if these rights were initially made to, or not made to, be in relation to politics in several depths.
Our assignment, however, is a debate between agreement and disagreement regarding human rights activism and its purpose, whether or not that purpose is mainly to defend those who are not in power and those who are blameless. I do agree that the main purpose for the rise of human rights is not solely limited to the need for protection and recognition for the innocent and powerless. If that were the case, then hypocrisies among writers who served as precursors for the push for human rights would not serve as evidence of alternative reasoning behind their creation and usage. Yes, the impoverished lacked human rights and protection. Yes, women and slaves did too. The men, the bourgeoisie and the noblemen, the philosophers and the well-educated, that served as forerunners of the human rights idea wrote without actually experiencing any moral-ethically wrong doings, without being the poor, uneducated and enslaved. Though, due to their persuasion of empathy, were able to be the voice of the people who needed the recognition, who needed the change.
The idea that human rights can be considered be anti-political, something pure and of good intention can be opposed through these documents about human rights written by men, about men, are ultimately for men. It is not done out of good intention, but for political motion, for defense and preservation of political standings and control. “…If they stand for political power’s moral limit regardless of its internal organization or legitimacy, what is their political positioning and effect in this work?” (p. 454). It’s a paradox for people in a society to push for human rights activism, for governmental changes and liberty, and can still withstand their limitations, rules and consequences in exchange for a few vague and symbolic ideas of rights. They’re then still put into a position of subjugation, whether it is seemingly lessened or simply not worth an additional fight, which then makes both the people and the authorities subject to hypocrisy. This also emphasizes that human rights, too, are actually just a political image of justice, rather than an active and exertion of justice.
In Lynn Hunt’s Inventing Human Rights, we have already seen complications with biases regarding who has proposed needs for rights and equality, who they were intended for and who oversees their implementations. In this reading, women are still being discussed as somewhat passive to men, and yet, they are not completely excluded and ignored. They are wanted, necessary and purposeful to men. In The Sexual Contract, there is a distinction mentioned regarding natural conditions and civil conditions. The significance of these conditions are who these conditions can be associated with. Natural conditions are associated with women, where women are irrelevant in public and political issues, but are inclusive as subordinates and sex-objects in the private world of marriage. Civil conditions, however, are associated with men of privilege and their roles in government and ultimate dominance.
Men, who are a part of this patriarchal government that women are mostly excluded from, have created these civil liberties and systems of governments not only to be authoritative over politics, but to be authoritative over women and to have access to hetero-sexual relations. The marriage contract to officialize the relationship between man and woman is odd though, according to Locke, considering that women are claimed to be naturally subjected to men. This can be related to previously mentioned historical needs to declare natural rights, rights that are supposedly self-evident. Due to the emphasis on marriage, sexual relations are a political move, a move that needs both man and woman to make. “The sons overturn paternal rule not merely to gain their liberty but to secure women for themselves. Their success in their endeavor is chronicled in the story of the sexual contract” (p. 2).
Incorporation of women into a sphere that “is and is not in civil society” is portrayed through obvious marriage contracts, though considered mostly of natural and private matter, are publicly acknowledged in civil societies. Their involvement goes deeper, as mentioned in chapter three, whereas their obedience is an act done submissively with the expectation of protection by the man in return. Here, because marriage is a private matter, we can see some limitations on forceful male power, apart from political standing, if the wife is willingly involved in making a marriage work for both partners’ benefits. Locke brings up the topic of family, where women are again inclusive, considering their parental power and voice over their children. In situations where there are problems between a married man and women, women have been known to exercise their right to leave their husbands, which proves that men, again, have no absolute control in all standings.
Incorporation of women are also evident through women’s contribution to trade and industry. Women, who are of a lower-ranking and status than men, make an economical difference when acknowledging prostitution; sexual favors in return for compensation. The contribution and profit the act has on capitalist production should make them recognizable in a capitalist and civil society, and yet, because of their subjection, their contributions are overlooked. Though it may not be considered morally ethical, their role is played in satisfying men in a civil society that isn’t so chivalrous and gallant.
Hi class, I’m Destiny Rivera and this is my first semester at CWE, Introducing and describing myself has always been a semi-challenging task for me, which is somewhat ridiculous considering that I should know myself better than anyone else. It’s a pensive question. It’s a question that makes you weigh your personal pros and cons. It’s a debate between deciding whether the answer should be of academic or of personal relevance, whether it’s interesting enough to share or whether some things are better left unsaid. Maybe this is just my perspective on the task because I am indeed a contemplative person. My thoughtful nature contributes to my interest in this class. I want to be educated on why human rights, a topic that is seemingly self-explanatory, is a topic of controversy, of debate.
The label “Founding Father” often refers to someone who contributed to a movement, someone almost revolutionary. Thomas Jefferson is widely known as a Founding Father by the United States of America, considering that he was the primary author of the Declaration of Independence. The Declaration of Independence, a document that emphasized that all men were created equal, contributed to the development of the idea that Man is entitled to these non-negotiable rights: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. According to Lynn Hunt (2007), these ideals and who they actually applied to were not explained enough. This document, a piece that served as a forerunner to the Universal Declaration for Human Rights adopted by the United Nations, is a work of controversy. Though there are a great quantity who idolize Jefferson, appreciative of his seemingly well-intentioned print, there are people who speak volumes against his credibility. The author, Jefferson, did not have enough credibility to make his belief of equality evident through his own reality, considering that he was a slave owner himself.
Jefferson’s hypocrisy, along with others men throughout history who have had the privilege to speak publicly, only adds disbelief to the idea that the rights of man, or human rights, should be evident and obvious. Several years later, after the Declaration of Independence had been published, a committee of forty deputies came up with articles that emphasized not only the rights of man, but of human rights before the law. In 1948, the United Nations adopted these articles as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Today, human rights can still be argued as clouded by restrictions, whether rights are limited to someone due to their religious practices, age, disability, and so on. With the recent and popular use of social media, our present generation can view uproars of inhumane acts globally, discrimination in almost every social setting, and injustices under the law.
The United States is guilty, much like many other parts of the world, of turning a blind eye to those in need: the impoverished, the addicts, the old, the young, minorities, immigrants, etc. We’re living in a world where Muslims cannot even converse in their own Arabic or foreign languages without striking fear into the lives of those who are not educated in that language, to those who are prejudice, and to those who are ignorant. We’re living in a world where protests are constantly happening to ensure that everyone is aware that all lives matter, an idea that Jefferson would have ensured was self-evident. Trayvon Martin. Eric Garner. Kendra James. These are the names of people, humans born with human rights, who may never know justice before the law. It seems to me that our Universal Declaration of Human Rights may have more than a few loopholes, where there is confusion between an ideal world and unattainable ideas.